America's situation in Afghanistan is deteriorating, Afghanistan's relations with key neighbor Pakistan are worsening and Afghanistan as a subject is mounting the list of U.S. election issues.

It remains the case that, given the genesis of the 9/11 attack, Afghanistan was and is the war that the United States must fight. Diverting the country into the Iraq war as President Bush did in 2002 while the work in Afghanistan was still only in its early stages was a tragic error then and is looking even more so with each passing day.

On Tuesday, U.S. forces abandoned the outpost in Kumar Province, where on Sunday nine Americans were killed and 15 wounded in a Taliban surprise attack in force.

American leaders have a tendency to believe that the way to remedy any difficult military situation is to add more U.S. troops. Both the Republican and Democratic candidates for president seem to think that to be the appropriate response to the worsening circumstances in Afghanistan. That could be right, or it could be wrong this time.

One of the problems is what some American, NATO and other observers see as insufficient attachment to resolve Afghanistan's security problems on the part of Afghans themselves and their government, led by President Hamid Karzai. Afghan forces are taking casualties too, but it is also the case that the Afghans remain very divided among themselves and that, after all, what one is seeing in Afghanistan is a civil war. The Taliban receive some outside support but are basically an Afghan organization.

Another problem is the role of Pakistan. Mr. Karzai has accused Pakistanis of mounting an assassination attempt against him. What is very clear is that Pakistan's willingness and ability to play a useful role in bringing matters under control in Afghanistan have been reduced by intra-Pakistani political wrangling between President Pervez Musharraf, the parliament-based government and other political and military elements in the country.

Finally, there is the question of what America's real interests are in Afghanistan nearly eight years after first putting forces into the country in late 2001. The goals were, first, to punish and get rid of the Taliban government that had hosted al-Qaida. The second was to replace the Taliban with a democratic government, capable of maintaining responsible authority. U.S. security assistance, to which was added later a NATO role, was intended to build up Afghan national forces capable of keeping the place in order and the Taliban out.

The question now, in the face of the desire of the American people to bring U.S. forces home from Iraq, is how many of them should be diverted to Afghanistan to try to save the situation there, as opposed to bringing them home to rest and refit. The answer to that question is not a slam-dunk nor easily susceptible to horseback campaign pronouncements by anyone.