Like many of the most talented Afghans, my interpreter dreamed of leaving his country to seek safety and opportunity in the United States. To do so, he had to travel to the U.S. embassy in Pakistan to apply for an entry visa. After he returned from this dangerous trip, I asked Dr. Mati if he had run into any problems along the way. He replied, "All of the Pakistani police shook me down for bribes." I asked if the Afghan police had done the same. "Some, but not as many."

In the complicated world that is Afghanistan, this indicated tangible progress. But the United States remains many miles from achieving "success" in the incredibly complex and challenging mission that is the building of a new Afghanistan.

The goal of our U.S. military forces and other government agencies is to produce an Afghanistan that is stable, secure, self-sustaining and democratic, where no such society existed before. This ambitious mission involves creating Afghan military and police forces, national governing institutions, local governing bodies, public works projects, a functioning education system, hospitals and economic infrastructure, all while fighting a determined, brutal and cunning enemy. As the saying goes, it is akin to building an airplane while flying it, and the effort will take years.

My question to Dr. Mati was not an idle one. My particular mission in Afghanistan was to lead a team charged with designing and implementing nationwide reform of the Afghan National Police, the ANP. While we do not typically associate police forces with military combat operations, in Afghanistan the police are both the first line of defense against the Taliban insurgency, as well as a primary source of the corruption and incompetence that have prevented the Afghan people from fully supporting the popularly elected government. The police are the face of the government for the average citizen, and since the people are the "center of gravity" in a counterinsurgency, fixing the police is vital in winning the war.

Reforming a civil institution in any country would be hard enough, but reforming the ANP presents special challenges. There is no tradition of effective law enforcement in the country, and the police have little training, very limited equipment and a history of corruption. The country's illiteracy rate runs to 90 percent and some of the district police chiefs and local mullahs are Taliban sympathizers. In most Afghan provinces, there are no components of the "rule of law," such as trained judges, jails, prosecutors, lawyers or criminal investigators. The police also are frequently the targets of Taliban attacks, dying at rates higher than the Afghan army.

When you add to this mix the fact that the country encompasses numerous dialects, political factions and tribes spread throughout rugged terrain in conditions of abject poverty, you can begin to fully appreciate what it is that we are asking our military to do in such nation-building exercises.

Achieving success in Afghanistan will require overcoming broader challenges, as well. Operations take place within a fragmented and convoluted organizational structure, where no one decision maker -- whether U.S., NATO, international or Afghan -- has the ability to develop and implement a coherent vision of Afghanistan's future. Everything is a negotiation.

Likewise, our allies, along with the non-governmental and international organizations operating in Afghanistan, routinely place caveats on the use of their forces and their resources. And to put our own commitment in perspective, U.S. force levels in Afghanistan are one fifth of those in Iraq, in spite of the fact that Afghanistan is a larger country both in terms of population and geographic area. Not surprisingly, the NATO commander -- a U.S. general -- recently called for significant increases in U.S. and NATO troop levels.

Adding to these challenges, there is no viable legitimate economy in Afghanistan, where the major source of revenue is the production of opium poppies -- ironically, something the Afghans have done so well that their poppies now account for more than 90 percent of the world's heroin supply.

There is no cultural or historical frame of reference for democratic governance in the country, just as there is no real middle class from which calls for representative democracy might spring. Corruption and a lack of accountability are widespread. There is little telecommunication, limited electricity and poor or nonexistent public infrastructure.

Finally, the U.S. military and supporting agencies working so hard in Afghanistan can only set the conditions for success, as the Afghan people and their emerging leaders must ultimately decide the shape of their country's future, when all is said and done.

What can the American people do to help?

First, pay attention. A recent poll indicated that the war in Iraq has fallen to fourth place on the list of serious concerns among Americans, with the war in Afghanistan not even making the list. Setting aside the vast sums of borrowed dollars that we are committing to our Afghanistan operations, there are vital national interests at stake -- Afghanistan borders Iran, China, the troubled states of the former Soviet Union and the struggling nuclear-armed state of Pakistan, where the leaders of al-Qaida and the Taliban have taken refuge.

Next, appreciate your troops and acknowledge their service. Our military forces are doing tremendous work in difficult circumstances, and their families also deserve heart-felt thanks for the special burdens they have borne for all of us since 9/11. I am proud to serve with some of America's finest men and women, people who clearly understand the responsibilities of citizenship in a free republic. In carrying out these nation-building missions, our troops have been called upon to execute a wide variety of missions not traditionally associated with military service, and they have done so with honor, energy and distinction.

Last, hold our elected political leaders responsible for charting the way ahead. While the average American citizen may feel unaffected by these events in faraway places, the truth is that the "long wars" in Afghanistan and Iraq likely will continue to place a heavy burden on our military and our federal budget, while straining our ability to respond to other crises around the world for years to come. Ultimately, it is our political leaders who will determine the force levels, missions and definitions of success that will shape the future of Afghanistan, Iraq and much of the world.

The stakes are far too high for us to fail.